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"NEW MEXICAN NATIONALISM"
AND THE EVOLUTION OF ENERGY POLICY
IN NEW MEXICO*
JAY B. SORENSON** and RAND GREENFIELD***
The wide gap between the state's vast natural resource wealth and
its relatively low per capita income highlight thoughts about what
New Mexico ought to look like in decades to come. New Mexico is a
state rich in energy resources. It ranks first in uranium production
and reserves; fourth in natural gas production; sixth in crude oil
production; and tenth in coal reserves.' It also has extremely promis-
ing solar and geothermal potential. Yet in 1975 New Mexico ranked
48th in per capita income, a slippage from 38th in only 12 years.,
The state faces serious problems in the areas of economic underdevel-
opment, unemployment and underemployment, health and education.
While the glaring gap between its wealth and relative poverty is to be
attributed to many factors, energy lies at the cutting edge of the
state's growth patterns, life styles, and its unique southwestern
environment. The energy industry is the single largest nongovern-
mental source of wealth, jobs and revenue in the state.3 Energy
reflects the way New Mexico lives and will continue to live for the
foreseeable future.
The failure to optimize this natural wealth to obtain social bene-
fits is largely due to the state's past energy policies and resource
management programs. The root of the problem is to be traced back
to the decisions made, or not made, that affected growth patterns
and the distribution of costs and benefits between industry and the
state. However, since 1973 and the birth of "New Mexican national-
ism," progress has been made in developing a comprehensive energy
policy and in thus obtaining social benefits from the state's natural
resources. An indication of this change came in 1975 when New
*The authors wish to express appreciation to the Division of Public Administration, Univ.
of New Mexico, for the generous support made available for this study under its Energy
Management Program and to Karen Marston for her invaluable research assistance.
**Jay B. Sorenson is a Professor of Political Science at the Univ. of New Mexico.
***Rand L. Greenfield is a Fellow at the Natural Resources Law Institute, Northwestern
Law School, Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon and is a graduate of the Univ. of
New Mexico, School of Law.
1. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, STATISTICS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES Tables 1141
& 1143 (1974).
2. Id., Table 611.
3. P. Grant, ENERGYTIC NEW MEXICO... THE POWER STATE 1-1 (1975).
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Mexico rose from 49th to 48th in per capita income.4 This article
will examine this evolution of energy policy in New Mexico and the
promise which "New Mexico nationalism" holds for the future of the
state.
Public policy is the end result of trade-offs of possible priorities to
arrive at a choice of management options. These decisions should be
based on a careful assessment of the total benefits and costs to the
society. However, no such clear expression of the public interest
usually exists. No matter how thorough the factual information avail-
able, policy decisions will always reflect society's conflicts over pos-
sible preferences and uses. Thus, public policy is the product of
group struggle, bargaining, and compromise. The coalition which can
identify its self-interest most closely with the public interest is the
winning coalition. The central task of government is to adjust these
conflicting interests so as to build a consensus, and to then strive for
equity in the distribution of costs and benefits within the resulting
social programs.
In New Mexico, as elsewhere in the U.S., both public and private
institutions make policy in the energy field. The market system is of
major importance in determining supply, price, and even demand.
Yet the market system has a limited purpose, immediate profits.
Only government, with its multi-purpose functions, can deal with all
the facets of long term public needs. State government plays a criti-
cal role in linking economic and political power and in securing
trade-offs between social, economic, and environmental priorities.
Much of New Mexico's problem turns on the past failure of state
government to be assertive in the pursuit of its numerous goals or in
its attempts to establish well defined priorities and policies.
However, New Mexico's predicament is not only a result of state
governmental failure. The problem is also a reflection of the nation's
life style and of the failure of the federal government to arrive at,
and to implement, an energy policy based upon a national consensus
and upon equity in the distribution of costs and benefits among the
states. The national philosophy of "more is better" has led to an
unfettered demand for energy. The federal government has relied
upon the marketplace for regulation of the production and use of
natural resources. The marketplace has been slow and inadequate in
adjusting itself to changes in the energy field.' In addition, New
4. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS (Aug. 1975-April
1976), as quoted in N.M. Legislative Energy Committee 2, Taxes and Revenue (1976).
5. Energy supply and demand are not sufficiently responsive to avoid short term prob-
lems. The demand side is relatively insensitive to short run price increases, due to the
consumer's lack of information and his sunk costs in expensive durables and equipment. On
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Mexico and other states, have been hindered in making such adjust-
ments by the pre-emption of the field by the federal government.
Nationally, the price signals began in the energy field in 1959, but
it took over twenty years for them to be fully recognized.6 Once
recognized, implementation of the adjustment process has involved a
20-25 year time span, and there is still public reluctance to accept
the new reality of energy scarcity. In New Mexico the main effect of
the adjustment has been extensive resource development and export
of up to 85% of its energy production.' This is reflective of the
insensitivity of the marketplace and the Federal government to the
state's needs.
The basis for New Mexico state government intervention to adjust
the market system has been both political and economic. While one
of its central activities has been to raise revenues, the state govern-
ment has acted to correct inadequate competitive forces, to satisfy
public concerns not reflected in the marketplace, and to distribute or
redistribute the costs and benefits of energy production in the state.
It has used the traditional tools of taxes and subsidies, regulation,
state ownership and leasing, and state research and development.
Viewed separately, many legislative programs in the energy sector
have been intended for the public good, at least as they were per-
ceived at the time. Yet when judged by the results, the programs
have benefited industry more than the public.'
The imbalance is not to be explained by a conspiracy theory, but
rather by government inaction and by counter-productive policies.
Many factors contributed to the failure of past energy management
policy to benefit the state: the state's low population density; its
lack of industrial development and internal markets; its late eco-
nomic and social development; its hierarchy of preferences and
values that stressed ranching and its concomitant land use policy of
allowing the unfettered use of private property; and the classic value
that "the best government is the least government." No clear doc-
trine of public interest existed and a tendency among many legis-"
lators was to identify the public interest with the self-interest of the
the supply side, changes tend to be slow, reflecting industry's need for heavy capital invest-
ment over a long period and the implementation of new technology. Other problems are
caused by incomplete price signals, imperfect competition, and the need to adjust for
external social costs such as environmental degradation. The result has been either a failure
to respond to changes or a lack of flexibility in making needed adjustments to the market
system.
6. R. Miller, THE ECONOMICS OF ENERGY 17-19 (1974).
7. Governor's Energy Impact Task Force, Managing the Boom in Northwest New Mexico
EDA 08-09-01784 (1977); P. Grant supra note 3, at 1-3 & 1-7.
8. Ford Foundation Preliminary Report, Exploring Energy Choices 1ff (1974).
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energy industries. Industry has generally opposed government inter-
vention to protect the consumer, the environment, or the poor and
has pressed for selective tax dispensations and the ready sale of pub-
lic energy resources. Thus the legislature pursued programs tilted in
industry's favor, frequently disassociating the social costs of the
development of the extractive industries in the state. New Mexico's
leaders clung to an unreconstructed optimism about the future which
overlooked the exhaustion of nonrenewable resources and the effects
of environmental degradation. Nor did they perceive that a private
company's market approach assigns more attention to short term
benefits than to long term social and economic costs, which are a
seldom profitable part of our physical and social world.
In the absence of a comprehensive view, policies emerged piece-
meal. Each resource was subject to different laws and administrative
policies, established at different times to serve different goals and
interests, but primarily designed to encourage resource development.
As a result, a crazy quilt of programs emerged for oil and gas, coal,
and uranium. Little effort was made to dovetail them, or to structure
goals with a single focus and objective. Conflicts over uses were
resolved to the advantage of private users, with priority for present
over future uses.
The fragmentation of state government also contributed to govern-
ment inaction and an imbalance in public and private influence. The
executive branch has been traditionally weak. Reflecting the distrust
of frontier politics, the governor's powers were extensively limited
and, until 1970, governors were limited to a two year term of office
with only one successive term allowed.' Many state officials like the
Attorney General and the Land Commissioner, normally under the
office of the Governor, were independently elected. While the state
legislature was stronger, its limitations were a reflection of the fact
that it was, and remains, a part-time and poorly paid legislature.
While made up of some very able and independent people, it was
very vulnerable to industry's pressures, encomiums, and, at times,
money. A weak governor and legislature meant, in essence, that the
state was run by boards, agencies and commissions, which tended to
be independent of both the executive and legislative branches.
Compounding the problem was the fact that no single authority
with sufficient power, staff, budget, or manpower existed to manage
the energy field or to help to develop future policies. The regulatory
system was weak, and not designed to cope with long term, large
scale development problems. The Public Service Commission was so
9. N.M. Const. Art. 5, § 1, as amended 1970.
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understaffed and underfunded as to be essentially non-regulatory.
Certainly, it lacked the financial resources and legal talents of indus-
try. The Land Office, run by a popularly elected official, pursued
immediate cash-flows in business arrangements that were often more
attractive to private than public interests. It made little effort to
assess the real value of its lands, to manage them, or to secure fees
reflecting their true value. The Oil Conservation Commission was
created to prevent unbridled conflict between oil companies rather
than to manage the development of resources for the future or to
protect the environment. Under the direction of Pete Porter1 0 it did
a commendable and professional job, but its scope did not encom-
pass long term policy. The entire process was aggravated by severe
jurisdictional disputes between agencies, individuals, and branches of
government. The net effect was weak, fragmented, and ineffective
public policy.
The failure in the field of public policy becomes visible when
benefits which have accrued to industry are assessed against the costs
the public has endured as the state's energy resources have been
developed.' ' The state has not been able to meet its short and long
term social obligations from the receipts received from its energy
extractive industries. Woefully short sighted, state government failed
in the management of the state's energy resources.
A change is setting in, however. It began on the eve of the 1973
crisis, and the crisis has helped the state to see more strikingly its
problems and its potential power. Since the crisis a massive effort has
been underway to adopt new policies and to reorganize on a massive
and fundamental basis. A consensus is forming across the state on
energy questions along lines that for want of a better word could be
called "New Mexican nationalism." It represents a profound loyalty
and attachment to the land and to environmental quality. The people
and their leaders have become determined to protect New Mexico's
self interest. The consensus is largely along negative lines, for the
public and its official representatives are not quite sure of the goals
or of the exact definition of the "public interest." Still agreement
exists on several key points: 1) the state's natural wealth is to be the
source from which its social needs are met; 2) New Mexico is to be
compensated for what it gives up; 3) the state is not to subsidize the
energy hungry and financially wealthy east and west; and 4) a policy
of self-reliance is to be pursued.
10. Peter Porter, Director of Oil Conservation Commission (April 1, 1956 to May 31,
1975).
11. N.M. State Planning Office, Grants Uranium Belt (1976); Managing the Boom in
Northwest New Mexico, supra note 7.
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It is not mere coincidence that such a consensus is shared by the
oil-producing nations of the third world. The period of exploitation
is at an end and the people of resource rich and socially poor regions
are demanding that their social needs be met. "New Mexican na-
tionalism" is an attempt to follow the successful policies of the
OPEC nations within the framework of a federal, constitutional gov-
ernment. New Mexico is not a sovereign state and cannot act in-
dependently of federal interests. New Mexico's unique nationalism
must and does seek to accommodate both federal and state interests
by striking a balance between the needs of the industrial powers and
the needs of those who support that power with their natural re-
sources.
Most revealing is the fact that the legislature of the state of New
Mexico is relying increasingly upon its legislative and regulatory
powers to realize the state's interests. The legislators have undertaken
steps to dovetail policy and to create a single, broad authority with
adequate financial support to fashion policy in the energy field. Most
significant, they have been willing to "bite the bullet" and authorize
intervention on the legal and economic level to force the private
sector to be more responsive to state needs and to help the state
solve its problems.
Perhaps the awakening began as early as 1966, when a legislative
memorial1 2 was introduced requesting the oil companies to refine
locally 50% of the crude oil produced in the state and to open
permanent offices in Roswell. This memorial was defeated. The rejec-
tion was based on the fear of many legislators that the companies
would flee the state, taking with them the basis for economic devel-
opment in New Mexico.
Yet economic slippage was occurring. New Mexico's relative posi-
tion on the per capita income scale was dropping. At the same time all
the major problems of the 1970s were becoming evident: a decline in
the supply of crude oil and natural gas; no comprehensive network
of intra-state pipelines; leases that did not provide for the supply of
royalty fuel to the state; a threat of federal curtailments based on
national depletion and low internal demand; a depressed uranium
and coal industry with a "bust effect" (which exhausts a resource
and substitutes no alternative industry or investment), and a state
intervention capability that was hardly credible on a federal or state
level.
The defeat of the memorial contributed to an uneasiness on the
12. House Joint Memorial 7 Oil & Gas Transfer, 2nd Session of the Twenty-Seventh
Legislature, New Mexico Legislature (1966); action postponed indefinitely.
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part of many legislators. New Mexico produced crude oil refined in
Texas and imported back as a finished product represents lost proces-
sing income from jobs, taxes, and commerce. The oil industry also
tied into a school system uneven in quality and not especially impres-
sive in comparison with neighboring states. The school formula at the
time was based on oil income and on the principle of the wealthier
districts receiving the greatest share of the available funds. For years
the formula was not changed because it was feared that an increase in
school taxes, to improve the overall system, would drive the compan-
ies out of the state. The corporations did nothing to disabuse anyone
of this belief, though they did not leave when the school formula
was changed in 1966 and 1974.' '
About the time of the energy crisis of 1973, stirrings were evident
in Santa Fe. An attempt to introduce a tax on users of energy pro-
duced in New Mexico failed,' as did a memorial which raised the
question of royalties in kind.' s The legislature also introduced legis-
lation to increase severance taxes.' 6 Industry resisted, and a compro-
mise was reached in the name of protecting the small independents,
but the mood of the legislators was evident.
On the executive side, Governor Bruce King initiated a number of
studies to inventory the state's energy resources, determine its short
and long term energy requirements, and to study the social, eco-
nomic, and environmental effects of energy development within New
Mexico. To meet the energy problems of 1973 he created a tem-
porary allocations Board, followed by an Energy Task Force.' I
By 1974 the temperament of the legislature was ripe for new
energy policies. A federal gas curtailment program imposed a "no
growth" limit on communities in the south and southeastern part of
the state, and ultimately affected 14 communities or 2/3 of the state,
particularly aggravated those legislators who bore the brunt of con-
stituent complaints. Dismayed by the federal government's quota
system they were outraged by an industry that was indifferent to the
state's plight. The name of the game became increase the state supply
of its own energy resources and increase its income.
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 77-6-36 (Repl. 1975) provided for direct appropriation to and
from the public school fund.
14. House Bill 70 Electricity Tax Act, First Session of the Thirty-First Legislature, New
Mexico Legislature (1973).
15. Senate Joint Memorial 10 Relating to In-State Deliverance of Oil & Gas; Relating to
Laws of 1972, Chapter 70 (7-11-13; 7-11-3.1b; 7-11-54.1), First Session of the Thirty-First
Legislature, New Mexico Legislature (1973).
16. House Bill 431 Relating to Taxation; Changing the Severance Tax Rates on Oil &
Gas, Coal & Uranium, First Session of the Thirty-First Legislature, New Mexico Legislature
(1973).
17. N.M. Executive Order No. 73-3, Jan. 16, 1973 under Governor Bruce King.
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THE POLITICS OF TAMING INDUSTRY
The battle to develop a more effective policy and to redistribute
the benefits and costs of energy was led by the powerful leader of
the Senate Finance Committee, Aubrey Dunn, D-Otero, and by the
newly elected Governor, Jerry Apodaca. Each moved independently
in the initial stages of the January 1975 legislative session.
Apodaca, having just won by less than 50% of the gubernatorial
vote, was an enthusiastic new governor eager to reorganize imagin-
atively to solve the state's energy and social problems. He was wary
of a confrontation, and pursuing a middle of the road approach, was
open to industry's efforts to communicate with him. However, he
created an energy office and instructed it to create an institutional,
regulatory, and policy framework for the state.' 8
At the same time Dunn was unconvinced of industry's willingness
to assist New Mexico to secure energy supplies or to solve its larger
social problems. Not being inclined to preside over a transfer of all
effective power to the new executive, he prepared for one of his
famous "poker games." Dunn instructed the Legislative Council to
prepare a tough draconian bill, which he apparently did not intend to
pass in its original form. Rather, he planned to force industry to
comply with efforts to solve the state's problems and, somewhat
secondarily, to perpetuate the stronger position of the legislature
vis-a-vis the executive.
The early efforts of the Senator and the Governor brought them
together, though negotiations were necessary to dovetail on the
nature, scope, and source of the authority of the energy agency to be
created. While Apodaca saw the virtue of a statutory authority with
strong legislative support, Dunn saw the wisdom of housing an
energy authority under the Governor, rather than creating a new
commission more independent of the Governor than responsible to
him. While they were able to reach agreement, and to readily subor-
dinate the executive-legislative issue, it is interesting to note that the
final act still left vague the hard question of to whom the Energy
Resources Board and its chief administrator is ultimately responsible.
Negotiations with industry were largely led by Dunn with the
Governor backing him, yet remaining in the background. However,
Fabian Chavez, the Governor's assistant, played an adroit role in
incorporating all sides in the hammering out of the final compro-
mise. Industry, at first, was not inclined to cooperate. It perceived
the bill as punitive, and believed industry's record of preventing the
change of energy laws would again prevail. Industry leaders were also
18. N.M. Executive Order No. 75-2, Jan. 22, 1975 under Governor Jerry Apodaca.
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afraid that the new energy board, because its jurisdiction extended to
both oil and mineral activities, would be less favorable to oil interests
than the then industry oriented quasi-independent Oil and Gas Con-
servation Commission. The oil and gas industry enjoyed the support
of the Land Office and the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
throughout the battle; these agencies perceived their independence
and power to be at stake. The oil and gas industry, however, split
over the proposed legislation. The independents, with the prevailing
voice in the industry's association at the time of the legislative ses-
sion, were inclined to favor the best bargain possible with the state.
The majors, on the other hand, wanted to hold the line. The indepen-
dents triumphed, and had a major input in drafting the legislation.
A sideplay of significance took place when the Governor's Council
of Economic Advisor's Sub-committee on Energy, which had strong
industry representation in Al Greer and Lou Harris (then President of
the Oil and Gas Association), pressed the Governor not to support
the harsh bill. This, in turn, led to negotiations between Greer and
Dunn and a substitute bill. The entire transaction contributed in a
significant way to the passage of the final legislation.
Two legislators, Bill Lee (D-Lea) and Fred Hansen (D-Chaves and
Eddy) were prepared to fight the passage of Senate Bill 186. How-
ever, the proponents of the legislation included both men in the
process of hammering out an acceptable piece of legislation and,
when the bill emerged, they supported it on the floor.
After the legislation was forged in the Senate, the House received
the bill in the last 10 days. Delay was the name of the game and
compromise came late in the session. The bill did receive a triple
referral and underwent some of the most extensive hearings ever
undertaken by the House Natural Resources Committee. Two legisla-
tors with strong backgrounds in the energy field [Fred Gross (R-
Albuquerque) in the vital Senate Finance Committee and Bob Grant
(R-Albuquerque) in the House Natural Resources Committee] helped
to guide the bill through their respective committees and on to the
floor. The legislation was passed as Senate Bill 186.' 9
The outcome of the negotiations left the basic structure of the
Energy Resources Board intact, but many of the penalty and regula-
tory provisions were struck. So much that was objectionable to in-
dustry was yielded that the Energy Resources Board appeared
hollow. The legislative view, however, was that the teeth could be
added by the legislature if the industry refused to cooperate.
The legislation was built on consensus. It was passed by bargain-
19. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-1 to -4 and § 72-20-2 to -5 and -14 (1975).
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ing, coopting opponents throughout the negotiations, and modifying
the bill while preserving the intent of the legislation. However, the
ambiguity of the act is also to be attributed to the nature of the
politics played. Surprisingly, environmentalists played no role in the
drafting of any of the energy legislation. They stayed out of the
picture from beginning to end. 2 0
The Energy Resources Act, creating the Energy Resources Board
(ERB), enacted a state policy to provide for:
(1) The energy needs of all the state's citizens;
(2) the proper regulation of the development and use of energy
resources;
(3) an economic climate to foster the energy resource extractive
industry and a national energy policy which will benefit the
state;
(4) the maximum possible economic return on the severance of non-
renewable energy resources, statewide planning, and the research
and development necessary to such planning; and
(5) the conservation of energy resources.
The Act provided for tax revenue not only from oil and gas but from
all other energy forms "severed from the soil of New Mexico." It
mandated that these tax receipts be used for ERB operations. The
Act merged various energy related agencies, such as the Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission and Land Office, under one roof. It also
created the office of State Geologist. 2'
In addition, the legislature passed Senate Bill 185, which provided
the state with is own Research and Development capability.2 2 The
objectives were multifold. Fundamentally, it was to provide funds to
research and develop energy capabilities. However, it also carried
implicit powers to enable the state to intervene in the energy sector
through a non-profit mechanism and, thus, to build its own refineries
and pipelines. Industry was particularly upset with this controversial
authority, and many legislators held deep reservations about state
intervention into the market place. No national legislation yet exists
to duplicate the deeds of the New Mexico legislature in its passage of
Senate Bills 185 and 186.
20. The environmentalists saw no point in getting caught in the powerplays underway.
They perceived that the state government was representing their interests and preferred, at
the time, to use their resources in other areas. The ever-increasing resource development in
the state has brought the environmentalists back into the area of energy policy, in cases such
as: uranium mining in the Cibola National Forest on Mt. Taylor, New Mexico's proposed
partnership in the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station near Phoenix, Arizona, and the
federal proposals for nuclear enrichment and waste disposal facility siting in New Mexico.
21. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-13-1 to -16 (Rept. 1975); § 72-20-14 (Repl. 1975).
22. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-12-1 to -8 (Repl. 1975).
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Other activity took place during and after the legislative session.
Representative John Mershon, one of the most powerful figures in
the legislature until he resigned his chairmanship of the House
Appropriations and Finance Committee in 1973, assumed a key role
in the creation of the joint Interim Legislative Energy Committee, of
which he became chairman. John O'Leary, a knowledgable and able
administrator who had formerly been with the Bureau of Mines and
the Atomic Energy Commission, was appointed by the Governor to
head the Energy Resources Board. Under the guidance of Dunn,
Mershon, and O'Leary the effort was undertaken, within the frame-
work of Bills 185 and 186, to shape a public policy and energy
management system for the state.
The supply situation in New Mexico continued to deteriorate. The
Southern Union Gas Co. (now Gas Company of New Mexico), which
buys more than 90% of gas produced in the state, had announced a
freeze on new gas in a number of New Mexico cities. The company
said this was in response to the federal regulation of interstate
usage.2 3 The response of the legislators was one of anger. At the
1976 legislative session, Senator Dunn introduced a legislative pack-
age to deal with the drastic situation. The package would:,
(1) in effect, declare Southern Union an illegal monopoly;
(2) authorize ERB takeover of gas distribution in areas where an-
nual increase in supply would be less than 5%;
(3) authorize ERB to contract for gas and to assume the regulatory
powers of the Public Service Commission;
(4) authorize nonprofit rural gas cooperatives;
(5) require full hearings on utility rates increases;
(6) require such rates to be based on original New Mexico costs and
not replacement value; and
(7) give the state half the profits from any subleases of state oil and
gas leases.2"
At the same time Mershon's Interim Legislative Energy Committee
also produced an energy package. Its main thrust was to provide for
an intrastate pipeline system with the possibility of state acquisition
of gas. It was geared to free supplies, and the state, from federal
regulation.2" Peter Hanagan, Executive Director of the producer's
23. A. Bouffard, SUG Seeks Halt to New Gas Hookups, Albuquerque Tribune, Jan. 10,
1976 at A-i.
24. W. Scott, Energy Package Bills Get Do Pass Albuquerque Journal, Feb. 6, 1976 at
B-12.
25. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-13-A (Repl. 1976). House Joint Memorial 5, Second Session of
the Thirty-Second Legislature, N.M. Legislature (1976) declares the state's policy regarding
natural gas production within the state; directs state agencies to implement policy and
request assistance of certain private companies.
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association, complained, "the state is an octopus, which is throwing
tentacles around the oil and gas industry." 2 6
Dunn's bills were once again intended more for bargaining than for
passage, and the legislation passed reflected the bargaining process. In
final form, HB 90 authorized ERB purchase of natural gas for resale
to political subdivisions or gas distributors within the state from a
revolving fund. Thus the state, through the ERB, can now intervene
to provide natural gas for its citizens.2 SB 19 of the Special Session
was the result of both Dunn and Mershon's battles. It authorized the
sale of up to $7 million in bonds for the Energy Resources Board "to
construct, own or on contract lease arrangements for the operation
of one or more pipeline systems, one or more natural gas gathering
systems, and one or more storage facilities." This can be done only at
the request of a political subdivision of the state and after public
hearings. The ERB was denied operating authority.2 8
The legislature also passed two significant memorials. HJM 5 de-
clared a state policy, not only to insure increased dedications of
natural gas to New Mexico but also that by 1980 fifty percent of
New Mexico produced gas will be available to intrastate pipelines.
Southern Union and the other gas companies in the state were re-
quested "to make concerted efforts to assist the state in achieving
the stated goal." 2" HJM provided for legal intervention in utility
matters." The joint memorials were perceived as the first enuncia-
tion of state energy policy. Industry had avoided direct legislative
action in many areas but the cost lay behind the memorials. Dunn,
with the assistance of O'Leary and Mershon, had engaged in intense
bargaining with industry for secret assurances on these commitments.
Major concessions were secured from industry; including a letter
from the Gas Company which stipulated they would assist the state
in its efforts to solve its energy problems. Even without enforcement
powers the ERB structure performed its task. The threat of legisla-
tive and ERB action sufficed to force industry to commit itself to
cooperation with the state under the announced energy policies.
In addition, the legislature passed the following bills: HB 8
26. L. Calloway, Senator Puts Pressure on SUG, Albuquerque Journal, Feb. 6, 1976, at
G- 1.
27. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-13-8.2 (Repl. 1976).
28. N.M. Star. Ann. § 65-13-8.1 to -8.5 (Repl. 1976).
29. HJM 5 supra note 24.
30. House Joint Memorial 8, Second Session of the Thirty-Second Legislature, N.M.
Legislature (1976) declares the need for information and expert legal assistance on energy
and utility related matters; requests state agencies and the legislature to develop a plan for
providing such information and assistance; requests a response.
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appropriated $250,000 to finance the state's effort to locate the
Solar Energy Research Institute in New Mexico.3 HB 94 authorized
tax bonds for a petroleum recovery research center at the New Mex-
ico Institute of Mining and Technology and for an addition to the
school's Bureau of Mines Building.3 2 HB 110 authorized $2 million
for energy research and development.3 3
What was not passed at the 1975 legislative session is significant. A
tax rebate bill for people on fixed income failed.3 4 The objective
was compensation for increased utility costs that were projected as
high as 50%. The Public Service Commission was reluctant to hurt
the low income sector. The proposal was passed unanimously by the
House but was tabled by the Senate Finance Committee. It was
dropped during the special session. This proposal has been assigned
high priority for the next session of the legislature.
The second bill to die was the 124 Gas Bill. It was the Fettinger
Bill of 1975. The issue involved was the purchase of gas by the state.
As in other states there is no "producer of last resort" in New Mex-
ico. If the industry does not want to produce or sell to the state,
there is nothing the state can do. This legislation would have pro-
vided for this contingency. The failure of this bill and the inability to
create this authority was significant.3 I
Another bill that caused some surface hilarity and a lot of intense
"behind the scenes" political infighting and power plays between old
political rivals was called the "yellowbrick road" bill. 3 6 It originally
called for the building of a new road that would assist a uranium
company. The debate developed into a discussion of the entire ura-
nium severance tax issue. Spilling over into the special session,
neither the road nor a tax increase was passed. However, it left the
entire question of raising uranium taxes for the next session.
31. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-37-3 (Repl. 1976).
32. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-18-37.33 (Repl. 1976).
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-12-8 (Repl. 1976).
34. House Bill 91 Second Session of the Thirty-Second Legislature, N.M. Legislature
(1976) and House Bill 7, Special Session of the Thirty-Second Legislature, N.M. Legislature
(1976); relating to taxation; providing for a tax credit for increased utility bills (failed).
35. House Bill 124, Second Session of the Thirty-Second Legislature, N.M. Legislature
(1976) relating to state lands; providing procedures for exercising and assigning options to
purchase certain minerals reserved to the state (failed).
36. House Bill 85, Second Session of the Thirty-Second Legislature, N.M. Legislature
(1976) relating to severance tax bonds; authorizing issuancyand sale for financing certain
highway construction; providing certain conditions; House Bill 37 Special Session of the
Thirty-Second Legislature, N.M. Legislature (same title as HB 85) (1976).
Senate Bill 23, Special Session of the Thirty-Second Legislature, N.M. Legislature (1976)
relating to taxation; amending sections 72-18-2 and 72-18-2.2 NMSA 1953 (Being Laws
1937, Chap. 103 § 2 and Laws 1972, Chap. 47 § 1 as amended).
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POLICY ISSUES FOR THE SHORT TERM
Since the 1976 legislative session, a great deal of activity has been
evident in the energy field. Hearings have been held by the ERB and
Mershon's Legislative Energy Committee on uranium taxes, utility
rates, natural gas allotments, and a host of other questions. It is
apparent that not only is legislation being prepared on these issues
but that O'Leary and Mershon are designing a comprehensive energy
policy for the state.
Due to curtailments and scarcity, the shortage of natural gas in
New Mexico remains a chronic problem. The curtailments presently
limit New Mexico's economic growth, and thus, are critical to New
Mexico's future. While remarkable progress has been made in the last
two years the problem still remains to free yet more of New Mexico's
natural gas (O'Leary's informal estimate is that the state is half way
to this goal).3" As supply continues to drop, and as the more power-
ful states with contract rights demand their share, New Mexico's
situation will become more complex and critical. Equity would call
for a redistribution so that New Mexico's share is linked to its needs
and to its supply of energy resources, but what politics will dictate is
another story. While the state's bargaining position is relatively
strong, the issue is a legal and political one, very sensitive and uncer-
tain.
The problems of royalty gas and oil and gas and oil in kind are
essentially problems of leases. Until 1972, leases written in the state
did not provide for the taking in kind of oil and gas royalties. The
leases have to be rewritten with provisions for such payment. By
virtue of its ability to intervene with the federal regulatory agencies
as a sovereign power, the state enjoys a strong bargaining position
with industry to force a rewriting of the leases for the purpose of
taking this gas and carrying it through an intrastate system. Should it
decide to do so, New Mexico can force the renegotiations of the
contracts.
An intrastate pipeline along with gas in kind could easily cure 90%
of the state's problem. A pipeline with gas in kind will enable the
state to provide gas to the areas that need it and to offer sufficient
quantities of fuel to attract the light, non-polluting industries on
which it is focusing. In the spring months of 1976 O'Leary and
Mershon's committees engaged in negotiations to attain these goals.
El Paso Natural Gas and SOHIO (Southern Union of Ohio) indicated
37. J. O'Leary, information derived from a personal communication, University of New
Mexico (April 6, 1976).
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a desire to enter into an abandonment procedure on an El Paso
pipeline, which presently runs at only 60% capacity. SOHIO would
buy it. Critical questions connected with the pipeline are how to
stimulate long term flows, and where to build extensions of the
pipeline. The location clearly has to tie in with decisions that will
make it possible to optimize for the long term. It is not clear that the
SOHIO deal answers this problem.
A refinery is part of the El Paso-SOHIO package. Many legislators
and the Governor have wanted one for a long time. It may be,
however, that the battle was lost 20 years ago and efforts to establish
refineries will not produce the results all hope they will. Oil is not
only in short supply in New Mexico, it is in a declining phase of
production. It is highly unlikely that New Mexico will witness a
production level that will ever be as high as in the peak years of the
past, though secondary and tertiary recovery offer some interesting
long term possibilities. A refinery would mean that the present
policy of transporting virtually all the oil produced in the state to
out of state refineries need not continue as the state's only option. It
could also mean that a portion of any oil shipped in a pipeline across
the state could be refined in the state.
One of the most important issues is state intervention. Intervening
is a game of bargaining. New York has a strong and effective record
of successful interventions. California has used it to New Mexico's
disadvantage. The SOHIO-EI Paso trade points up the strong position
of the state. The business deal requires an abandonment procedure
before federal agencies. New Mexico is required to agree to the cor-
porate trade and to intervene on behalf of the companies' request. In
other words, with the state's cooperation El Paso can get an aban-
donment release; without such cooperation it cannot. New Mexico
can expect some of its needs to be met as a trade off for its support.
The entire process is very costly, and the company is vulnerable.
While negotiations have become stalled, the El Paso deal indicates
that the process can work. New Mexico is clearly preparing to build
up its abilities to play the intervention game.
New policies in the area of uranium and the nuclear industry are
also major areas of immediate concern. Sixty percent of the uranium
in the U.S. is in New Mexico. The best grade and most accessible ore
is here.8 The demand for uranium can be expected to rise at an
exponential rate over these ten years. Some foresee the price of
uranium as high as $100 a pound in the next 3-5 years. New Mexico's
38. E. Arnold, NEW MEXICO ENERGY RESOURCES 1976; Annual Rep. of Off. of the
State Geologist (1976).
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present tax on uranium is 1%." 9 While corporate income is in the
millions state revenues are in the thousands of dollars. Saltbeds in the
southeastern part of the state have also led the federal government to
eye New Mexico as a high level waste repository. With its near mon-
opoly of uranium supply and its favorable site location New Mexico
is in a strong position to use uranium and the tail end of the nuclear
fuel cycle as a base to secure greater cash flows to the state, as well as
concessions from the federal government on a series of issues; in-
cluding the middle of the fuel cycle and commitments from industry
to invest, build and remain in the state. The state should be able to
easily increase its uranium taxes without adversely influencing the
development of the industry in New Mexico. At the moment, the
enormous economic rents that are generated by uranium are lost to
the state and all the benefits go to the federal government and the
producing companies. The uranium issue at the next session of the
legislature could well be the testing ground of the entire natural
resource issue in the state.
CONCLUSION
These are just a few of the immediate problems. Many others
exist, some reflect policy failures on the part of legislators and
energy managers. Certainly, a major issue is the steep increase in fuel
costs that is out of line with the rest of the nation and with what
many in the state can afford to pay. Problems of impact growth on
small communities still appear to be without any managed or far-
sighted solutions. Problems with the Native Americans remain to be
solved as well. The state must also pursue vigorously the develop-
ment of its alternate energy sources; solar, geothermal, and wind
energy, so that when its coal, uranium, gas and crude oil resources
are exhausted it will have new sources to fall back on.4" Major
problems exist as well in the very important areas of clean air, water
use and quality, open spaces, and land use in all aspects. These are
thorny questions; especially critical is that of water, which remains
"king" in the West and over which battles, much like those of the
frontier days, are still being fought. The solutions to these problems
are all dependent upon the trade offs New Mexico makes in imple-
menting its energy policies.
While disagreement exists over whether New Mexico should stress
39. The uranium tax as of 1976 was 1% according to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-18-2 but
there are two 50% deductions under § 72-18-2.2 which means that the tax is 1% after the
deductions or 1/%.
40. Such developments could save high costs in some of the most scenic areas of the
state, conflicting with tourism and recreation which are two other major industries.
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its energy-industrial, agri-industrial, or "sunbelt" alternatives (prob-
ably, all will occur and intermesh), much will turn on the rate of
New Mexico's growth, which i presently quite slow. It would appear
that maximum unfettered growth is as questionable as zero growth.
The first would involve levels of environmental degradation that have
proven unacceptable to most New Mexicans. If a consensus exists on
any major aspect of energy development in New Mexico it is that
most people in the state are not prepared to see it reduced to a
"wasteland" to serve industry or the heavily populated East and West
coasts. Zero growth, on the other hand, ultimately means perpetual
unemployment and underdevelopment, and this would also appear to
be unacceptable to a majority of the citizenry and representatives in
the state. Thus, the answer to the management and policy questions
of energy development would appear to lie within the framework of
a "limited, managed" growth rate. What this will be is difficult to
say, for it is clear that, like a comprehensive state energy policy, a
growth policy will not be handed down by gubernatorial edict, the
ERB, or the legislature. Nor will it come from industry. It will come
only as coalitions emerge from long debate and hard bargaining over
the serious conflicts of resource use at all levels of political life in
New Mexico.
Disagreement continues to exist. The clashing of economic, re-
gional, ethnic, and class interests continues to be the hallmark of
politics in the state. The disagreement, the uncertainties over goals
and policies are inhibiting the effective adoption of comprehensive
policies and solutions. Yet headway is being made. At the moment
the question is which of the hard choices between the costs and
benefits of developing energy resources within the state will be made.
While this debate is occurring and coalitions are forming, a new
balance can be struck between the market place and government. It
is impressive to see what has occurred in the course of the last three
years, even if the final results are not yet in. The public policy
mechanisms essential for the sound management of resources are
those that tie costs to benefits and optimize for social benefits. Such
mechanisms are being realized. Failures and shortcomings are evi-
dent. Whether or not creative leadership and sound public policies
will continue to be provided remains to be seen. Yet consensus poli-
tics is making it possible for the state to press ahead with very bold
and imaginative policies. In comparison to other states and the fed-
\eral government, New Mexico appears to be leading the way to sound
and effective energy policies.
In a strange but not unpleasant way it is "New Mexican national-
ism" that lies at the heart of the emerging consensus and which is
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responsible for the new energy management and policy systems evi-
dent on the level of state government. There is little doubt that the
political elite of conservative and liberal persuasions, as well as the
vast bulk of the populace, are in agreement that the wealth of New
Mexico is to be used for the benefit of the people and the state. It is
thus possible to do today what could not be done yesterday; to make
the trade offs between the private and public sectors and between
national and state interests which are necessary for the welfare of the
state and of the nation. Thus New Mexico may enjoy greater choices
for the future.
